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GOVERMENT LIABILITY AND THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Two children lay dead in Commerce City, Colorado, victims of a
drunken teenage driver.' Just prior to the accident, the teenager had
been in police custody. 2 Although the police were aware that the teen-
age driver was intoxicated, they released him into the custody of his
brother.3 The victims' parents thereafter brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against the Commerce City Police Department. 4 It is precisely situ-
ations such as this to which the public duty doctrine is applicable. 5
1. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 153-54 (Colo. 1986) (wrongful death action
brought on behalf of pedestrians struck by automobile driven by intoxicated
person whom police officers had released in custody of younger brother). For a
discussion of Leake, see infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
2. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 154 (Colo. 1986). The Commerce City po-
lice officers were dispatched to break up a teenage party after a neighbor com-
plained. Id. While ordering the teenagers to disperse, 18 year old Ralph Crowe
became disruptive and was handcuffed and detained by the officers. Id.
3. Id. After Ralph Crowe's detention, the police officers were approached
by Ralph's 17 year old brother Eddie Crowe. Id. Eddie Crowe requested that
Ralph be released to him and told the officers that he would drive his brother
home. Id. After noting that Eddie appeared sober and possessed a valid driver's
license the officers agreed to permit Ralph Crowe to leave the party with his
brother. Id.
4. Id. The representatives (respondents) of the two children struck and
killed by Ralph Crowe brought the action against Ralph Crowe, his fatherJames
Crowe, the five Commerce City police officers who responded to the party, and
Commerce City (petitioners). Id. James Crowe was subsequently dismissed
from the action by stipulation of both parties and Ralph Crowe was not a party
to the Colorado Supreme Court appeal. Id. at n.5.
Respondents alleged that the police officers had reason to believe Ralph
Crowe was intoxicated at the time of his detention and were thus negligent in
failing to take him into custody. Id. at 154. Respondents further alleged police
negligence in the release of Ralph Crowe to his younger brother, since it was
foreseeable that Ralph Crowe would drive intoxicated and that injury to the
public was therefore a foreseeable consequence. Id.
After a hearing, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 153. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for
trial. Id. (citing Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)). In 1986 the
Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari, and reversed and remanded the
case to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the trial court's order
granting summary judgment. Id.
5. See id. at 155-56; see also Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147,
444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (summary judgment granted on basis of public duty doc-
trine in action against town for police officer's failure to arrest drunken driver);
Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d 611, 484 N.E.2d 909 (1985)
(county found not liable to patrons of restaurant serving contaminated food in-
spected by county health department where duty to warn was public duty); Cox
v. Department of Natural Resources, 699 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (pub-
lic duty of state agency to maintain safe swimming area held not actionable by
(505)
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The public duty doctrine is utilized in situations where an individual
attempts to hold a governmental entity liable for breach of a duty6 owed
to the general public. 7 Generally, absent a "special relationship" 8 be-
tween the injured plaintiff and the government, the public duty doctrine
effectively provides a common law immunity for the negligent acts of
government officials. 9
private plaintiff); O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33,
460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1983) (public duty doctrine denied liability for negligent nat-
ural gas line inspection); Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985) (po-
lice officers not liable for injuries suffered in accident later in evening after
"sobered" driver was allowed to drive car away).
6. A " 'duty' " is defined as a "question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff ... to which the law will
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct to-
ward another." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 at 356 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
W. KEETON]; see also Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 344 Pa. Super. 9,
495 A.2d 963 (1985) (requisite element of cause of action in negligence is duty
on part of defendant to conform to certain standard of conduct with respect to
plaintiff).
7. See Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental Unit From Tort
Liability on Theory That Only General, Not Particular, Duty was Owed Under Circum-
stances, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1194, 1196 (1965). The public duty doctrine provides that
"a governmental entity is not liable for injury to a citizen where liability is al-
leged on the ground that the governmental entity owes a duty to the public in
general, as in the case of police or fire protection." Id; see also 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 4(8) (1966 & Supp. 1986) ("individual has no right of action for failure to
perform a duty owed to the public as such"); Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent
Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS., 303, 322-23 & nn. 94-95 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection] ("Govern-
ment officials, and more recently their employers, have long been held liable for
their tortious conduct only if the duty of due care breached was one owed to a
particular individual, and not one owed to the public in general." (emphasis in
original)); Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 821, 823-24 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Police Liability] (discussing
origins of public duty doctrine); Note, A Unified Approach to State and Municipal
Tort Liability in Washington, 59 WASH. L. REV. 533, 537 & n.32 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability] ("The public duty doctrine pro-
vides that ordinarily the duties of government agents arising from governmental
activities are owed to the public in general and not to any specific individual.").
8. See Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 824. In the context of the public
duty doctrine, a "special relationship" is recognized by the courts:
[W]hen a citizen becomes singled out from the general population and
a special duty is owed him by the governmental entity. Such a duty is
established by a special relationship between the government and the
citizen and the breach of that duty may result in liability for the dam-
ages suffered by the citizen.
Annotation, supra note 7, at 1196.
For a discussion of the "special relationship" exception to the public duty
doctrine, see infra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, A Unfied Approach, supra note 7, at 537; see also Warren v. District
of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (where police answered call and arrived
outside scene of robbery and repeated gang rape, such response created no spe-
cial relationship or liability to victims for failing to ascertain attacks were not
continuing). See generally Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental
[Vol. 32: p. 505
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While the public duty doctrine persists as the majority rule in the
United States today,' 0 the doctrine has come under increasing criticism
in recent years for its harsh effect upon victims who would otherwise be
Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection, 46 A.L.R. 3d 1084, 1088 & n.3 (1973)
("[C]ourts generally have adopted the rule that there can be no liability on the
part of a municipality for its failure to provide police protection ... unless some
,special relationship' is shown.").
The emphasis of this Note is upon alleged acts of police nonfeasance.
"Nonfeasance" is generally defined as "passive inaction or a failure to take steps
to protect . . . from harm." W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 56, at 373 & n.3. In
contrast, police acts of "misfeasance" or "active misconduct working positive
injury to others" are not considered herein. Id. The rationale behind this dis-
tinction according to PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS is that by misfea-
sance "the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by
,nonfeasance' he has at least made the situation no worse, and has merely failed
to benefit him by interfering in his affairs." Id. at 373 & n.4.
10. Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137
(1983) (highway patrol officer had no duty to investigate accident and preserve
evidence for civil litigation under public duty doctrine); Sestito v. Groton, 178
Conn. 520, 423 A.2d 165 (1979) (plaintiff must prove that police officer owed
duty to plaintiff's decedent and not public in general where officer witness failed
to stop public disturbance until after decedent was shot); Rieser v. District of
Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (public duty doctrine applied in action
against department of corrections for failing to comply with regulation requiring
disclosure of parolee's prior sex-related convictions), modified, 580 F.2d 647
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo.
1982) (under state law child abuse statute created only duty to public and could
not support individual's cause of action); Namauu v. Honolulu, 62 Haw. 358,
614 P.2d 943 (1980) (police department's duty to apprehend escaped mental
patient not actionable by individuals under public duty doctrine); Huey v. Cic-
ero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968) (municipality not liable for failing to
protect racial minority under public duty doctrine); Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v.
Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871 (1971) (police force not liable
under public duty doctrine for failing to halt wave of criminal activity); Hendrix
v. Topeka, 231 Kan. 113, 643 P.2d 129 (1982) (police officer not liable for death
of former state mental patient under public duty doctrine); Frankfort Variety,
Inc. v. Frankfort, 522 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1977) (fire department held not liable for
negligent fire fighting under public duty doctrine); Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392
Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984) (public duty doctrine did not bar plaintiff's
action and thus town held liable for negligent failure of its police officers to
remove from highway intoxicated automobile driver who subsequently caused
injury to other travelers); Foshee v. Detroit, 76 Mich. App. 377, 256 N.W.2d 601
(1977) (city not liable under public duty doctrine for failing to secure vacant
house wherein plaintiff's decedent was found dead by strangulation); Hage v.
Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981) (duty of fire inspection held to be a public
duty and not actionable by individuals); Frye v. Clark County, 97 Nev. 632, 637
P.2d 1215 (1981) (duty of county to fight fires was public duty and not actiona-
ble); O'Connor v. New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1983) (municipality held not liable for negligent inspection of natural gas line
subsequently causing explosion); Shelton v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ohio App.
2d 125, 367 N.E.2d 51 (1976) (state not liable for negligent boiler inspection
under public duty doctrine); Melendez v. Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466
A.2d 1060 (1983) (city not liable for failing to protect youth shot by neighbor
during period of racial unrest under public duty doctrine); Barratt v. Burling-
ham, 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985) (drunk-driving laws impose upon police officers
general duty to public and not individual drivers); J & B Dev. Co. v. King
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entitled to a cause of action absent the public status of their alleged
tortfeasors.I I Hostility toward the public duty doctrine is evidenced by
the abrogation of the doctrine by courts in several jurisdictions in favor
of a traditional negligence analysis. 12
This Note will provide an overview of the public duty doctrine.
Specifically, it will examine the "special relationship" limitation of the
public duty doctrine and the methods by which courts have come to
abolish the doctrine. 13 Furthermore, this Note will examine the caselaw
and commentary regarding the public duty doctrine's continued viabil-
County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983) (public duty doctrine applied to
issuance of builders permit by county).
11. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986) (citations omitted); see
generally IA. C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 11.74 & n.3 (1986)
("good courts are increasingly repudiating [the public duty doctrine] used to
continue tort irresponsibility of local governments"); Note, State Tort Liability for
Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7 (critiquing public duty doctrine application
to negligent fire inspection cases); Note, Court of Claims Act, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
199 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Court of Claims Act] (criticizing New York
application of public duty doctrine).
12. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 243 (Alaska 1976) (abolishing public
duty doctrine and finding case "governed by the usual tort principles"); Ryan v.
State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (abolishing public duty doctrine and
holding state to same tort liability as "ordinary citizens"); Leake v. Cain, 720
P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (public duty doctrine held no longer applicable in Colo-
rado and duty of public entity in negligence action is to be determined in same
manner as private party); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371
So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979) (holding governmental negligence to be determined by
non-public entity standards since public duty doctrine did not survive legislative
abolishment of sovereign immunity); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa
1979) (abolishing public duty doctrine and holding the state to same negligence
standard as private litigants); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M.
671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984) (statutory abolishment of public duty doctrine with
sovereign immunity subjects public entities to "traditional tort concepts of
duty"); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979) (abolish-
ing public duty doctrine and holding city liable for employee torts "just as any
private employer"); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132
(1976) (same); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986) (abolishing public
duty doctrine and holding traditional negligence principles as proper standard
for grant of summary judgment).
To constitute a "traditional" negligence cause of action the plaintiff must
allege (1) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,
(2) breach of that duty, (3) which actually and proximately caused (4) damage to
the plaintiff. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1986) (quoting W. KEE-
TON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30 at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or.
401, 591 P.2d 719, 722 (1979) (listing requirements of cause of action in negli-
gence); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132, 135
(1976) (same).
13. The primary emphasis of this Note is upon the state courts' application
of the public duty doctrine to law enforcement officers' negligent provision of
police protection. However, the public duty doctrine applies to the acts of gov-
ernmental entities in general. Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note
7, at 537 & n.32. Therefore, this Note utilizes cases dealing with other govern-
mental duties, such as inspection, or fire protection, to give the reader a thor-
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ity. Finally, this Note will conclude that courts should abandon the pub-
lic duty doctrine because an innocent victim of police negligence should
be fairly compensated for his or her injury and law enforcement itself
would ultimately benefit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Public Duty Doctrine and Its Subsequent Limitation Through the
"Special Relationship Exception"
Often referred to as the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine, 14 the
public duty doctrine provides that since government owes a duty to the
public in general, it does not owe a duty to any individual citizen.15 The
origins of the public duty doctrine may be traced to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in South v. Maryland.16 In determining
whether a county sheriff who refused to arrest the plaintiff's kidnappers
could be held liable for his nonfeasance, the South Court held "[i]t is an
undisputed principle of the common law, that for a breach of a public
duty... [the sheriff] is amenable to the public, and punishable by indict-
ment only." 17 Thus, the Court found no cause of action arising from a
breach of duty to provide police protection to an individual.' 8
ough and genuine overview of the present trends in application of the public
duty doctrine.
14. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain,
720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979).
15. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain, 720
P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County
371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979).
16. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). In South, the plaintiff alleged that he was
kidnapped and held for four days and released only when he secured the ransom
money demanded by his kidnappers. Id. at 398-99. The plaintiff further as-
serted that the local sheriff knew he had been unlawfully restrained yet did noth-
ing to obtain his release or arrest the kidnappers. Id. at 399. The plaintiff sued
the sheriff for refusing to enforce the laws of the state and for failing to protect
the plaintiff. Id. The circuit court awarded the plaintiff a substantial judgment.
Id. at 401. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed finding the
sheriff's duty to keep the peace a "public duty." Id. at 403.
17. South, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 402-03. After articulating the public duty
doctrine, the Court noted its reasoning was well founded in the common law:
The history of the law for centuries proves this to be the case ....
[N]o instance can be found where a civil action has been sustained
against [a sheriff] for his default or misbehavior as conservator of the
peace by those who have suffered injury . . .through the violence of
mobs, riots, or insurrections.
In the case of Entick v. Carrington... Lord Camden remarks: "No
man ever heard of an action against a conservator of the peace, as
such."
Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
18. Id. The South court specifically noted that the plaintiff had failed to al-
lege any "special individual right, privilege, or franchise" that he was deprived
of by the sheriff's actions. Id. The public duty doctrine as established in South
1987] NOTE 509
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Prior to the development of the public duty doctrine, sovereign im-
munity 19 shielded many municipalities from tort liability for the majority
was subsequently adopted by most state courts. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152,
155 n.6 (Colo. 1986). The leading tort law treatise of the era articulated the
doctrine stating:
The rule of official responsibility, then appears to be this: That if the
duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the
public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous perform-
ance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed,
if at all, in some form of public prosecution.
T. COLLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 379 (1879).
The author thereafter provided an illustration of the doctrine's application
to a case of negligent police protection:
The [public duty doctrine] does not depend at all on the grade of the
office, but exclusively upon the nature of the duty. This may be shown
by taking as an illustration the case of the policeman; one of the lowest
grade of public officers. His duty is to serve criminal warrants; to arrest
persons who commit offenses in his view, to bring nightwalkers to ac-
count .... Within his beat he should watch the premises of individuals,
and protect them against burglaries and arsons. But suppose he goes
to sleep upon his beat, and while thus off duty a robbery is committed
or a house burned down, either of which might have been prevented
had he been vigilant,-who shall bring him to account for this neglect
of duty? Not the individual who has suffered from the crime, certainly,
for the officer was . . . not hired by him, paid by him, or controlled by
him; and consequently owed him no legal duty. The duty imposed
upon the officer was a duty to the public-to the State, of which the
individual sufferer was only a fractional part, and incapable as such of
enforcing obligations which were not individual but general. If a po-
liceman fails to guard the premises of a citizen with due vigilance, the
neglect is a breach of duty of exactly the same sort as when, finding the
same citizen indulging in riotous conduct, he fails to arrest him; and if
the citizen could sue him for the one neglect, he could sue also for the
other.
Id. at 381 (footnote omitted), quoted in Leake, 720 P.2d at 155 n.6.
The public duty doctrine was repeated in subsequent editions of the treatise
without criticism. See T. COLLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 446 (2d ed.
1888); 2 T. COLLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 756-57 (3d ed. 1906); 2
T. COLLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 385-86 (4th ed. 1932); see also W.
KEETON, supra note 6, § 131, at 1049 & nn.78-80 ("Thus ... a failure to provide
police protection, like the failure to provide fire protection, is usually immune
... on the ground that the duty to protect is owed to the public at large and not
to any particular person who might be injured.").
19. The general rule of sovereign immunity is "based on the idea that the
king could do no wrong, the immunity of the modern state is much like that of
the federal government." W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 131, at 1043. This immu-
nity acts as a complete defense to the tort liability of the state and its agencies.
See id.
The sovereign immunity doctrine was inherited from English jurisprudence
and extended to insulate both municipal corporations and state governments
from suit. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 131, at 970-7 1,
977-87 (4th ed. 1971); Mathes &Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity
for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. LJ. 889, 890-94 (1965) (authors argue
for both practical and policy considerations for change in area of police civil tort
liability); see also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1963) (author examines history of sovereign immunity
[Vol. 32: p. 505
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of police activities because such activities were considered "governmen-
tal" functions.2 0 The rationale for incorporating the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine into American common law, however, has been described
as "one of the mysteries of legal evolution." '2 1
Although there is a trend toward abrogating the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine either by direct judicial action, 22 or legislation, 23 a major-
doctrine as applied to suits against administrative officers in England and United
States).
20. Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 823; see also W. PROSSER, supra note
19, § 131, at 979. In his treatise, Professor Prosser distinguishes "governmen-
tal" functions, which were historically immune from liability, from "proprietary"
functions under which the government "may be liable." Id. at 978-79 (footnotes
omitted). A "proprietary" function is defined as when "the city performs a ser-
vice which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenue from it." Id. at 980. The rationale for liability attaching
under such circumstances is that municipalities operating in the "proprietary"
role are "capable of much the same acts as private corporations ... having the
same special and local interests and relations, not shared by the state at large." Id.
at 977 (emphasis added). Therefore municipalities should be subject to the
same liability as their private counterparts. Id.
In contrast, the municipalities are not liable when engaging in a "govern-
mental" function including "the torts of police officers, even where they commit
unjustifiable assault and battery ... or are grossly negligent." Id. at 979. "Gov-
ernmental" functions are typified as those that "can be performed adequately
only by the government." Id. The primary rationales proffered in support of
immunity for such functions are: (1) "fear of an infinity of actions," (2) the fact
"that the government derives no profit from the exercise of governmental func-
tions, which are solely for the public benefit," and (3) the concern that "cities
cannot carry on their governments if money raised by taxation is diverted to
making good the torts of employees." Id. at 978; see also E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAw
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.79-.80, at 439-51 (3d rev. ed. 1984) (citing
cases).
21. Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7, at 307
(quoting Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924-
25)). Justice Douglas, for example, discussing the application of sovereign im-
munity in the United States, merely stated that "it has been the theory of law,
since the beginning, that the King could do no wrong." Note, State Tort Liability
for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7, at 307 (citing W. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC
OF LIBERTY 204 (1954)). Application of the sovereign immunity doctrine has
been utilized, for example, to immunize three municipal defendants from liabil-
ity for alleged negligence of their police officers engaged in a high speed chase.
See Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 296 (Miss. Ct. App. 1983).
In Oberkramer, the defendants were several police officers and their three munici-
pal employers. Id. at 289. The plaintiffs were the widow and minor children of a
police officer killed by a vehicle attempting to elude police in a high speed chase.
Id. The plaintiffs charged the municipalities under the doctrine ofrespondeat supe-
rior for the alleged "failure to request and failure to receive" instructions regard-
ing continuing the pursuit and for failure to have a pursuit policy, thereby
creating an "unreasonable risk of harm to the public." Id. The court held that
the defendants were engaged in a governmental function and were thus immune
from suit, unless immunity was expressly waived by statute. Id. at 296. The
court further concluded the alleged failure to request and receive instructions or
have a pursuit policy did not fall within the statutory waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. Id. at 297.
22. See, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969)
7
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ity of jurisdictions still rely on the public duty doctrine as enunciated in
South 24 to shield public officers and their municipal employers from lia-
bility for negligent nonfeasance.2 5 For example, in Shore v. Town of Ston-
ington,26 the plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death of his
decedent pursuant to a statute permitting tort actions against a munici-
pality. 27 Shore's decedent was killed by a drunken driver who had been
stopped, but not arrested, by a town police officer approximately one
hour before the accident.2 8 Applying the public duty doctrine, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut denied the plaintiff's cause of action,
stating that "the special duty required to maintain the action cannot be
established by the mere fact that someone with whom the official had
prior contact subsequently injured the plaintiff or the plaintiff's dece-
(sovereign immunity held no longer applicable in tort action against county for
failure to arrest law-violating drivers); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457, 55 Cal. 2d 211 (1961) (sovereign immunity doctrine
discarded as "mistaken and unjust"); Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs of El
Paso County, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971) (doctrines of sovereign and
governmental immunity overruled as defenses to tort claims); Willis v. Depart-
ment of Conservation and Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970)
(state held not immune from suit arising out of traumatic amputation of child's
arm while feeding bear in state recreational facility); see also W. KEETON, supra
note 6, § 131, at 1052 & n.1 (discussing abolition of sovereign immunity
doctrine).
23. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 12, § 10; ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.50.250-.300 (1983);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.14 (1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-901 to 928 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:2-6 (West Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-.300 (1983);
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-31-1 to 7 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5601-5605
(1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.010-.200 (1973 & Supp. 1987).
Statutes abolishing sovereign immunity in these jurisdictions typically
provide:
"[E]very governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages
arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and
those of its employees acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function,
where the governmental entity if a private person or entity would be
liable for money damages under the laws of the [S]tate."
Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7, at 320-21 (foot-
notes omitted); see also W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 131, at 1052 n.2 (discussing
abrogation of sovereign immunity by statute).
24. For a discussion of South see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of jurisdictions applying the public duty doctrine see
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26. 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).
27. Id. at 148, 444 A.2d at 1380 n.1.
28. Id. at 150, 444 A.2d at 1381. In Shore, a town police officer had ob-
served a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed and repeatedly crossing the
center line. Id. The officer, who subsequently spoke to the driver after follow-
ing him into a parking lot, did not arrest the driver but merely cautioned him to
"slow down and ... let his girlfriend drive" if he wanted to retain his license. Id.
At trial, the court found evidence that the driver was then under the influence of
drugs or intoxicants. Id. Approximately one hour later the released driver
struck another vehicle killing plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 151, 444 A.2d at 1381.
512 [Vol. 32: p. 505
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dent." 2 9 Therefore, the Shore court held that the police "owed no spe-
cific duty to plaintiff's decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of the
state."
30
Although the main difference between sovereign immunity and the
public duty doctrine is only theoretical,3 1 strict application of the public
duty doctrine resurrects complete sovereign immunity as to public of-
ficers. 3 2 Those jurisdictions which embrace the public duty doctrine,
however, rely on several policy considerations to support their deci-
sion.3 3 The principal rationales espoused by the courts are fear that ab-
olition of the public duty doctrine will unduly interfere with
governmental operation and subject government to an overwhelming
29. See id. at 156, 444 A.2d at 1381-83. The court held that the public duty
doctrine was applicable to the case because:
[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a
duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or errone-
ous performance, must be a public and not an individual injury, and
must be redressed, if at all in some form of public prosecution. On the
other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to
perform it or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may
support an individual action for damages.
Id. at 152, 444 A.2d at 381-82 (citing Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90,
116 A.2d 429, 432 (1955)).
The Shore court held the law required "a showing of imminent harm to an
identifiable victim" to precipitate a public duty becoming an actionable special
duty. See id. at 152, 444 A.2d at 1382. The court discerned no such showing in
Shore and affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
town. Id. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1383-84.
30. Id. at 150, 444 A.2d at 1380. The Shore court concluded that its deci-
sion was justified under the following policy rationale:
The adoption of a rule of liability where some kind of harm may happen
to someone would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the
limits desirable in our society .... We do not think that the public
interest is served by allowing a jury of laymen with benefit of 20/20
hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a policeman's discretionary
professional duty. Such discretion is no discretion at all.
Id. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1384.
31. Note, A UnifiedApproach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 537 ("The public
duty doctrine would reinstate complete sovereign immunity, because the distinc-
tion between no duty and immunity is only a theoretical difference."); see also
Note, Court of Claims Act, supra note 11, at 200-01 (stating particularly in tort law
remnants of sovereign immunity "have been 'judicially resurrected' by requiring
litigants who sue [a] city to establish that a duty is owed specifically to them,
rather than ... the public at large.").
32. See, e.g., Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 158, 160 (Colo. 1986). In Leake, the
Colorado Supreme Court remarked that "whether or not the public duty rule is
a function of sovereign immunity, the effect of the rule is identical to that of
sovereign immunity. Under both doctrines, the existence of liability depends
entirely upon the public status of the defendant." Id.
33. Shore, 187 Conn. at 152, 444 A.2d at 1382. The Shore court noted the
distinction between "public and private duty is an expression of the many policy
considerations which lead the law to determine whether interests of a particular
type are entitled to protection against conduct by officials." Id.
9
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financial burden.3 4
The public duty doctrine, however, is not an absolute bar to recov-
ery.3 5 Even where the rule prevails, significant exceptions have nar-
rowed its scope of application.3 6 One such exception to the doctrine
allows a cause of action for negligent police protection.3 7 This excep-
tion is limited to those situations in which the plaintiff can demonstrate a
"special duty or relationship" between the victim and police.3 8
Generally, a special duty or relationship exists where the govern-
ment singles out a particular party from the general public and affords
that person special treatment.3 9 For example, in Schuster v. City of New
34. See, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376,
381 (1969) ("The extent of potential liability to which [abrogating the public
duty] doctrine could lead is staggering."); Kean v. Chicago, 98 Ill. App. 2d 460,
463, 240 N.E.2d 321, 322 (1968) (public duty doctrine required to protect city
government from "an all but impossible burden"); Stranger v. New York Elec. &
Gas Corp., 25 A.D.2d 169, 172, 268 N.Y.S.2d 214, 217 (1966) (holding abroga-
tion of public duty doctrine would " 'unduly and indeed indefinitely' " extend
governmental liability); see also Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 309, 656 P.2d 597,
598 (1982) ("We are ... told that [if the public duty doctrine is abolished] not
only will the public treasury suffer but government will come to a standstill be-
cause its agents will be afraid to act."); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo.
1986) (noting financial impact on government and interference with govern-
mental operations in defense of public duty doctrine); Chambers-Castanes v.
King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 291, 669 P.2d 451, 461 (1983) (Utter, J., con-
curring) (citing additional cases rationalizing the public duty doctrine on basis of
preventing "excessive governmental liability" and "hindrance of the governing
process").
35. See Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 824 ("The [public duty] doc-
trine is not an absolute barrier to recovery, for courts universally recognize a
duty when a 'special relationship' exists between plaintiff and the police.").
36. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986).
37. See, e.g., Annotation, supra note 7, at 1196.
The courts have recognized ... that there are instances when a citizen
becomes singled out from the general population and a special duty is
owed him by the governmental entity. Such a duty is established by a special
relationship between the government and the citizen and the breach of
that duty may result in liability for the damages suffered by the citizen.
Id. (emphasis added); see E. McQUILLAN, supra note 20 at § 53.51 (citing cases);
see also Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (duty to warn
only imposed by federal legislation, federal assumption of duty, or special rela-
tionship between government and victim); Bruttomeso v. Las Vegas Metropoli-
tan Police Dep't, 95 Nev. 151, 591 P.2d 254 (1979) (no liability for failure to
supply police protection absent special duty or relationship owed particular indi-
vidual); Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d
583 (1978) (municipality held liable for breach of assumed special relationship
to provide substitute school crossing guard); Chapman v. Philadelphia, 290 Pa.
Super. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (1981) (special relationship generally exists only when
individual is exposed to special danger and authorities undertake responsibility
to provide adequate protection); see generally Annotation, supra note 7, at 1197-
203 (citing and discussing "special relationship" cases).
38. For a discussion of the special duty or relationship exception to the
public duty doctrine, see infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
39. J & B Dev. Co., v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 305, 669 P.2d 468,
10
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York, 4 0 the New York Court of Appeals applied the public duty doc-
trine, 4 1 but denied the city's motion to dismiss the action for failing to
provide adequate protection to a young man murdered as a conse-
quence of aiding them in the arrest of a notorious fugitive. 4 2 The court
reasoned that the police owed a "special duty to use reasonable care for
the protection of persons who [aided] in the arrest or prosecution of
criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their
collaboration."
43
Although the public duty doctrine's special duty exception can be
difficult to invoke, 44 a special duty has been found to arise in three situa-
471-72 (1983); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 285, 669
P.2d 451, 457-58 (1983).
The public duty doctrine cannot be used to avoid liability where a "special
relationship" exists between the public entity and the plaintiff. Leake v. Cain,
720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986) (citing Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530
P.2d 234 (1975); accord Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala.
1970) (government owed special duty to protect Internal Revenue Service un-
dercover agent threatened and injured for testifying on behalf of government);
Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964)
(county liable for breaching special relationship created by sheriff and deputies
who promised warning to decedent upon release of arrested person); Gardner v.
Chicago Ridge, 71 Ill. App. 2d 157, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966) (police owed special
duty to protect plaintiff called to scene of arrest to make an identification), later
appeal, 128 Ill. App. 2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919
(1971).
40. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). In Schuster
plaintiff alleged his intestate supplied information to the police leading to the
arrest of a dangerous fugitive. Id. at 79, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
Schuster immediately thereafter received death threats and immediately in-
formed the police. Id. However, no protection was afforded Schuster and he
was shot to death three weeks later outside his home. Id.
41. Id. at 81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70.
42. Id. at 80, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69.
43. Id. at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The basis of the
majority opinion was simple reciprocity. See id. at 81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180
N.Y.S.2d at 270; see also Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 824. Since citizens
have a duty to aid in law enforcement, the court held the government in turn
owed a duty of protection when such aid places citizens in danger. 5 N.Y.2d at
80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
In his concurring opinionJudge McNally suggested an alternative source of
a special policy duty. Id. at 87, 154 N.E.2d at 541, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (McNally,
J., concurring). Since the police had provided temporary protection to Schuster,
Judge McNally argued that the government had voluntarily assumed a duty it
could not renounce as long as Schuster remained in danger. Id. (McNally, J.,
concurring). The judge based his conclusion on an established rule of tort law
that " 'one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become
subject to the duty of acting carefully if he acts at all.' " Id. (quoting Glanzer v.
Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922)). Judge McNally's argu-
ment that the duty was voluntarily assumed by the police is thus distinguishable
from the majority's theory of reciprocity holding that a citizen's aid to police
triggers a mandatory duty of protection.
44. See, e.g., Biloon's Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Wilmington, 401 A.2d 636 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 417 A.2d 371 (municipality not liable for fire damage to
plaintiff's business during riot absent showing of special relationship between
11
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tions. The first situation is where a statute or ordinance indicates a clear
legislative intent to protect a specific and identifiable class of persons of
which plaintiff is a member. 45 The second situation is where the plaintiff
relied on express or implied assurances made by a governmental agent or
entity with whom the injured party had direct contact.4 6 The third situa-
municipality and plaintiff); Melendez v. Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466
A.2d 1060 (1983) (plaintiff shot by neighbor failed to establish special relation-
ship owed by police despite alleged assurances of protection due to racial ten-
sions); Chapman v. Philadelphia, 290 Pa. Super. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (1981)
(complaint that decedent died from attack and robbery on platform of railroad
station was properly dismissed in absence of facts showing special relationship
between decedent and city).
The public duty doctrine is consistent with the general tort principle that a
plaintiff's recovery is contingent on the demonstration of a duty owed him or
her. See Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 539. The doc-
trine, however, is inconsistent with traditional tort analysis by requiring a "spe-
cial relationship" prior to formation of a duty upon which plaintiff can sue. Id.
Traditionally, where a person should foresee his or her act, or failure to act, to
involve an unreasonable risk of harm, there is a duty to avoid such harm through
reasonable care. See, e.g., Griesenbeck v. Walker, 199 N.J. Super. 132, 488 A.2d
1038, cert. denied, 101 N.J. 264, 501 A.2d 932 (1985) (negligence action brought
against social host for alleged negligent acts of intoxicated guests); Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp. v. Phillips, 87 Pa. Commw. 504, 488
A.2d 77 (1985) (motorist's widow and children brought wrongful death and sur-
vival action against Department of Transportation and others for fatal injury
sustained by motorist in collision caused by ice patch on highway); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). However, there is no duty to pre-
vent a third person from harming another, absent a special relationship between
the actor and the wrongdoer or between the actor and the victim. Id. at § 315.
In contrast, under the public duty doctrine, a duty arises from the relation-
ship between the government agent and an individual or class of persons. See
Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 539. Thus, the special
relationship requirement serves the function of limiting the number of individu-
als to whom the government owes a duty. Id. The government is thereby fa-
vored over private parties in negligence actions. Id. Because the special
relationship requirement imposes on victims the financial burden of damages
caused by a municipality's negligence, it has been subjected to extensive criti-
cism. Note, Court of Claims Act, supra note 11, at 205 n.93 (citing Hopkins, Munici-
pal Tort Liability in Iowa, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 861 (1981-1982) ("[b]etter the
taxpayer bear the financial burden of injury than the guiltless injured party")).
45. See, e.g., Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984)
(statute created duty on part of police officer to arrest intoxicated driver for the
benefit of motoring public); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530
P.2d 234 (1975) (city ordinance found to create special duty for city electrical
inspector to disconnect hazardous electrical system).
46. See Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Bloom v. City of New York, 78 Misc. 2d 1077, 357
N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). When such assurances are present, the
courts generally hold that law enforcement officers have a duty to provide the
promised protection to the citizen. See, e.g., Morgan, 230 Cal. App. at 944, 41
Cal. Rptr. at 513 (sheriff who promised to warn plaintiff of impending release of
dangerous prisoner obliged to do so); Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d
462 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (special duty to victim found where parole officer had duty
to disclose parolee's full record of sex offenses to employer under Department
of Corrections policy), modified on other grounds, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en
516
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tion is where the plaintiff is harmed as a result of aiding or abetting the
police, often as an informer or witness.
4 7
Many jurisdictions which adhere to the public duty doctrine, how-
ever, do not allow the special duty exception to nullify the rule.48 For
example, in Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 49 the Washington Supreme Court
went to great lengths to apply the special relationship exception, with-
out expressly abandoning the public duty doctrine. 50 In Campbell, a city
electrical inspector, informed of a short circuit electrifying a creek bed,
failed to disconnect the power running to the circuit as required by city
ordinance. 5 1 Instead, the inspector merely placed a warning message
banc); Silverman v. City of Fort Wayne, 171 Ind. App. 415, 357 N.E.2d 285
(1976) (police promise to protect plaintiff's property against riot damage found
to create special duty of protection); Bloom, 78 Misc. 2d at 1078, 357 N.Y.S.2d at
981 (assurances of police protection from riot damage created a special duty to
plaintiffs); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451
(1983) (special relationship based on assurances via telephone between plaintiffs
and dispatchers that police were en route). But see Warren v. District of Colum-
bia, 444 A.2d I (D.C. 1981) (police dispatcher's promise of assistance to rape
victim's repeated pleas for help failed to create special relationship exception to
public duty doctrine).
The rationale applied most frequently by judges finding a duty to provide
police protection where the plaintiff relied on assurances of such protection, is
that they are merely compelling police to perform a ministerial act in fulfilling
their voluntarily assumed obligations. See, e.g., Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230
Cal. App. 938, 942-43, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (1964) (construing discretionary
nature of sheriff's decision to promise protection with ministerial nature to ful-
fill such.).
47. See Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (gov-
ernment has special duty to protect informant when reasonable cause to believe
he is endangered due to aiding federal agents); Gardner v. Chicago Ridge, 71
Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966) (police owed duty of protection to vic-
tim attacked during suspect identification), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971); Es-
tate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081
(1978) (government has duty to protect property against credible threats of van-
dalism after caretaker aids police investigating past criminal acts); Christy v. City
of Baton Rouge, 282 So. 2d 724 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (police owe duty to protect
assault victim attacked while aiding police in arrest), application denied, 284 So. 2d
776 (La. 1973).
48. See Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 540. The
Washington Supreme Court, for example, has "effectively eviscerated" the pub-
lic duty doctrine through expansive application of the special relationship rule,
thereby effectively allowing tort suits against the government where such would
be permitted under common law principles of negligence. Id. at 540 & n.45.
However, the court continues to apply the public duty doctrine because it allows
the court to retreat from conventional tort principles while relieving the govern-
ment of liability through failure to find a special relationship. Id.
49. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975).
50. Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7, at 333 &
n. 151.
51. Campbell, 85 Wash. 2d at 13, 530 P.2d at 241. In Campbell, the plaintiff
and his family lived adjacent to a creek passing through the property of a neigh-
bor, George Schafer, who had placed electric lights in and around the stream.
Id. at 3, 530 P.2d at 235. The plaintiff subsequently became aware of a danger-
ous electric current in the water and phoned the city electrical inspector. Id.
13
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on the electric system owner's door.5 2 The inspector took no further
action and five months later plaintiff's decedent fell in the creek and was
electrocuted. 53 The Washington Supreme Court held the city liable on
the basis that the ordinance had created a mandatory duty for the in-
spector to disconnect power to the circuit. 54 However, the court explic-
itly recognized the general validity of the public duty doctrine. 5 5
In addition, courts adhering to the doctrine generally find three cat-
egories in which the degree of intimacy between police and plaintiff is
too attenuated and therefore seldom ascribe liability to the government
for alleged nonfeasance in these situations.5 6 In one category, courts
are reluctant to impute liability where police are aware of a narrowly
defined and readily identifiable source of danger to the public, but can-
not reasonably foresee a specific victim. 5 7 In a second category, courts
52. Id. Finding the wiring extensively deteriorated and no one home, the
inspector affixed a prominent red tag on the lighting system owner's door warn-
ing that the wiring constituted a "threat to life ... [and] will have to be corrected
immediately or the service will be disconnected." Id. at 3-4, 530 P.2d at 236.
Apart from a telephone call to the lighting system owner's residence the next
morning, no further action was taken. Id. at 4, 530 P.2d at 236.
53. Id. Five months later, the plaintiff's 6 year old son fell into the creek
and received a paralyzing shock. Id. His mother rushed to his rescue. Id.
Although the son survived, his mother did not. Id. Plaintiff claimed the inspec-
tor's negligence in the inspection and inattention to remedying the situation
proximately caused his wife's death and his son's injuries. Id. at 5, 530 P.2d at
236.
54. Id. at 9, 530 P.2d at 238-39. The City of Bellevue vigorously contended
that the enforcement of its electrical safety regulations were public duties, the
breach of which were only enforceable, if at all, by the city, and created no duty
to any individual. Id. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to recover, even
though it refused to overrule the public duty doctrine, by holding that the requi-
site "special relationship" had been formed between the parties, thereby justify-
ing an exception to the general rule of non-liability. Id. at 10, 530 P.2d at 239.
55. See id. at 9, 530 P.2d at 239. The Washington Supreme Court stated it
"had no particular quarrel at this time" with the public duty doctrine. Id. The
Washington Supreme Court has to date continued to maintain the doctrine's
viability. See, e.g., J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d
468 (1983) (public duty doctrine applied in case of negligent issuance of build-
ing permit); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d
451 (1983) (public duty doctrine applied in complaint of negligent failure of
police to respond to emergency calls in timely fashion).
56. For a discussion of courts' reluctance to impart liability for police non-
feasance, see supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985) (police owed no
duty of protection to victim of intoxicated driver cited for traffic offense but not
arrested prior to accident) Wuethrich v. Delia, 155 N.J. Super. 324, 382 A.2d
929 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (per curiam) (police not liable for death of assault
victim regardless of failure to investigate prior complaints of assailant's danger-
ous conduct), cert. denied, 77 N.J. 486, 391 A.2d 500 (1978); Evers v. Westerberg,
38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1972) (police owed no duty of protection to
victim of drunken driver not arrested by police at earlier accident), aff'd mem., 32
N.Y.2d 684, 296 N.E.2d 257, 343 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1973); Melendez v. Philadel-
phia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983) (plaintiff shot by neighbor failed
to establish special relationship with police despite alleged assurances of protec-
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refuse to impose liability where police are aware of a danger to a specific
individual, but have not jeopardized the plaintiff through affirmative acts
or promised protection. 58 Finally, courts are hesitant to impute liability
where police are aware of a more generalized threat such as a "wave of
criminal activity," but fail to provide adequate protection.
59
Thus, courts applying the public duty doctrine effectively restrict
government's duty to individuals. 60 Government is thereby favored
tion due to racial tensions); Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985)
(police officer's attempt to force apparent intoxicated driver to remain in park-
ing lot until sober failed to create "special relationship" with passenger injured
in subsequent accident).
In Melendez, for example, a boy who was shot in the eye by a neighbor dur-
ing a racial confrontation brought an action against the City of Philadelphia.
Melendez, 320 Pa. Super. at 61, 466 A.2d at 1061. Plaintiffs asserted the minor's
injuries were caused by the nonfeasance of the city's police department and
human relations commission, who allegedly failed to adequately protect the
neighborhood after having been apprised of racial problems in the community.
Id. at 61-62, 466 A.2d at 1061. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a
grant of summaryjudgment for the city applying the public duty doctrine. Id. at
64, 466 A.2d at 1065. The court noted that under Pennsylvania law the only way
for plaintiff to overcome the public duty doctrine was if a "special relationship"
was demonstrated between himself and the police. Id. at 64-65, 466 A.2d at
1063. Addressing that issue, the court held that "[n]othing occurred which
would have focused the police department's attention on the minor appellant or
his assailant so as to create a special duty. The mere happening of an event...
does not predicate liability." Id. at 67, 466 A.2d at 1064.
58. See, e.g., Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(knowledge of planned attack on plaintiffs did not create a duty of protection by
FBI); Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975) (no
duty of protection owed by police to murder victim who informed police of im-
minent danger and requested help); Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d
647 (Ct. App. 1979) (no duty for police to respond promptly to witness' call to
assist assaulted child); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (police owed no duty of protection to plaintiff
threatened by rejected suitor).
59. Compare Keane v. City of Chicago, 98 Ill. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321
(1968) (police knowledge of violence in schools created no duty to protect
teacher assaulted on school grounds); Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Ev-
ansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871 (1971) (police owed no duty to
protect corporate plaintiff's business by halting crime wave); and Bruttomesso v.
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't, 95 Nev. 151, 591 P.2d 254 (1979) (police
had no duty to provide security for outdoor film festival at which plaintiff was
stabbed) with Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404
N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978) (municipality held liable for breach of special relationship
to provide protection to each school child using crosswalks that police agreed to
supervise). Cf. Eisman v. Port Auth. Trans. Hudson Corp., 96 Misc. 2d 678, 409
N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (installation of television monitors by rapid
transit system for security purposes may have created duty of protection to
passengers).
60. See, e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (no
duty to rape victim repeatedly promised assistance by police dispatcher under
public duty doctrine); Riss v. New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (under public duty doctrine police had no duty to provide
protection to victim of violent assault who repeatedly requested protection from
jilted suitor); Melendez v. Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983)
15
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over private parties in defending against negligence actions. 6 1 How-
ever, this restrictive approach has been increasingly criticized by courts
and legal scholars for placing the burden of municipal negligence en-
tirely upon the victim.
6 2
B. The Minority View: Abrogation of the Public Duty Doctrine
In contrast to the jurisdictions which adhere to the public duty doc-
trine, there is a small but growing minority of jurisdictions that have
explicitly rejected the public duty doctrine. 63 The landmark case of Ad-
ams v. State64 stands as the earliest decision in which a court rejected the
(police owed no duty of protection to plaintiff despite assurances to neighbor-
hood of protection due to racial tensions); see also Note, A Unified Approach to Tort
Liability, supra note 7, at 539 ("The special relationship requirement [of the pub-
lic duty doctrine] restricts the number of individuals to whom the government
owes a duty.").
61. Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 539.
62. Note, Court of Claims Act, supra note 11, at 205 & n.93. The public duty
doctrine has been extensively criticized by commentators and by judges dissent-
ing from, and concurring with, opinions upholding the doctrine. See, e.g., Cham-
bers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 290, 669 P.2d 451, 460 (1983)
(Utter, J., concurring) ("I would ... reject this 'public duty' doctrine embraced
by the majority inasmuch as I believe respondents' duty toward appellants rests
upon the traditional tort principles of policy and foreseeability rather than the
existence of an ill-defined special relationship and reliance upon explicit assur-
ances."); Hage v. State, 304 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Minn. 1981) (ScottJ., dissenting)
(arguing majority's upholding of public duty doctrine constituted refusal to ac-
cept abolition of sovereign immunity); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,
580, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968) (Keating, J., dissent-
ing) (stating public duty doctrine "is premised upon a legal rule which long ago
should have been abandoned, having lost any justification it might once have
had."); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 136, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637,
265 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting) ("[a]ny court created
tort-immunity rule should be forthrightly abandoned when its injustice and its
unreality are so evident as to produce exceptions, interpretations and inconsis-
tencies galore"); IA C. ANTIEU, supra note 11, at § 11.74 & n.1 (1986) ("[c]ourts
have too often created a rule of social irresponsibility by ruling that cities and
counties, which have tested, chosen, trained and sanctioned police personnel,
are not liable for their torts within the scope of employment, employing the
fiction that their duty was not to the persons killed or injured by police activity,
but only to the general public."); see generally Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent
Fire Inspection, supra note 7 (critiquing public duty doctrine's application to fire
inspections cases); Note, Police Liability, supra note 7 (criticizing public duty doc-
trine and suggesting alternative methods of determining police liability); Note,
Court of Claims Act, supra note 11 (criticizing New York application of public duty
doctrine); Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7 (critiquing Wash-
ington's application of public duty doctrine).
63. For a list of jurisdictions rejecting the public duty doctrine, see supra
note 23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of those jurisdictions and com-
mentators which have criticized the public duty doctrine, see supra notes 11 & 22
and accompanying text.
64. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (superseded by ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070
(1977) as stated in Wilson v. Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1983)).
520 [Vol. 32: p. 505
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public duty doctrine. 6 5 In Adams, plaintiffs alleged that state fire officials
inspected a hotel and thereafter negligently failed to take action upon a
number of known fire hazards. 6 6 Relying upon the public duty doctrine
in its defense, 67 the State of Alaska argued that any duty owed was to the
public generally and thus was not actionable by the plaintiffs as
individuals. 68
The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected the state's argument on two
grounds. 69 First, the court found that the duty owed was "not one owed
to the general public ... [but was] a limited one, and its beneficiaries a
limited class." 70 Second, specifically addressing the efficacy of the pub-
lic duty doctrine, the court stated that it considered the public duty doc-
trine to be "in reality a form of sovereign immunity." 7 1 Since sovereign
immunity was abrogated by statute in Alaska, the Adams court stated that
application of the public duty doctrine would reinstitute immunity
against the clear mandate of the legislature. 72
Similarly, one month later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin abro-
gated the public duty doctrine in Coffey v. Milwaukee.7 3 The plaintiffs in
Coffey alleged that the city had negligently inspected certain defective
standpipes which were incapable of providing sufficient water to extin-
guish a conflagration in plaintiffs' building.7 4 The city asserted in its
65. See Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986).
66. 555 P.2d at 239. In Adams, the state had "undertaken to inspect the
Gold Rush Hotel for fire safety." Id. at 238. The inspectors found several haz-
ardous conditions and promised the manager a letter detailing the violations so
that they could be corrected. Id. However, the letter detailing the violations was
never sent and "little further action appears to have been taken by the state." Id.
at 239. Some eight months later, the hotel caught fire killing five people and
injuring many. Id. at 236, 238.
67. Id. at 241.
68. Id. In Adams, the court noted: "The state... raises an argument based
upon its special public status. Its theory, and one traditionally recognized, is
that an entity such as the state, which owes a duty to the public generally, does
not owe an actionable duty to any individual." Id.
69. Id. Before rejecting the argument, however, the Adams court recog-
nized that the theory was well respected in other states. Id. at n.16.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court characterized the public duty doctrine as "the duty to all,
duty to no one doctrine." Id.
72. Id. The Adams court explained that:
[a]n application of the public duty doctrine here would result in finding
no duty owed the plaintiffs or their decedents by the state, because,
although they were foreseeable victims and a private defendant would
have owed such a duty, no "special relationship" between the parties
existed.
Id. at 241-42 (footnote omitted). The court further inquired into the policy be-
hind the public duty doctrine asking, "[w]hy should the establishment of duty
become more difficult when the state is the defendant? Where there is no immu-
nity, the state is to be treated like a private litigant." Id. at 242.
73. 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
74. Id. at 530, 247 N.W.2d at 134-35. Plaintiff Coffey asserted in his com-
plaint that the city had breached a duty to him by negligently inspecting the fire
1987] NOTE
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defense that the public duty doctrine relieved it of liability. 7 5
The Coffey court rejected the city's defense holding that the "public
duty-special duty" distinction set up the same type of artificial distinc-
tion between "proprietary" and "governmental" functions 76 which had
been discarded when the court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. 7 7 Rejecting the public duty doctrine, the court found it appro-
priate to determine the city's liability by employing a traditional
negligence analysis. 78
The trend in this area has continued toward governmental liabil-
sprinkler standpipes in his building. Id. at 531, 247 N.W.2d at 135. The court
noted that the municipal immunity defense had been abolished from tort law in
Wisconsin, and thereafter addressed the city's assertion of the public duty doc-
trine in its defense. Id. at 535-36, 247 N.W.2d at 137.
75. Id. at 535, 247 N.W.2d at 137. Plaintiff Coffey's complaint asserted that
the City of Milwaukee had been obliged to inspect at periodic intervals the
standpipes in his building for safety purposes pursuant to state statute. See id. at
533-34, 247 N.W.2d at 135-36 (relying on Wis. STAT. § 101.14 (1973) (fire in-
spections and prevention)). The city contended that "the duties imposed on the
building inspector by the applicable statutes with respect to fire safety inspec-
tions [were] clearly duties owed to the public in general and not to the specific
plaintiff in this case." Id. at 535, 247 N.W.2d at 137. Therefore, the city argued,
"there can be no liability on the part of a municipality for the breach of such a
'public duty.' " Id.
76. For a discussion of the "proprietary" and "governmental" functions of
municipal governments, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
77. Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 540, 247 N.W.2d at 139 (citing Holytz v. Milwau-
kee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (Wisconsin Supreme Court abroga-
tion of sovereign immunity)). The Coffey court granted plaintiffs a cause of
action against the city for negligent inspection stating that "[a]ny duty owed to
the public generally is a duty owed to individual members of the public ...
Under the circumstances of this case, there is no distinction to be drawn be-
tween a 'public duty' and 'special duty.' " Id.
78. Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 540, 247 N.W.2d at 139. The Coffey court held the
elements necessary to maintain a cause of action for negligence were "(1) [a]
duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage
as a result of the injury." Id. at 531, 247 N.W.2d at 135 (citations omitted).
The court further held that a governmental entity could incur a duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care once its building inspector undertook to inspect the
building. Id. at 540 & n.2, 247 N.W.2d at 139 & n.2. The court based its deci-
sion upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the pro-
tection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third
person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reason-
able care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the
third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) ("Liability to
Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking")).
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ity.7 9 In 1979, three more states rejected the public duty doctrine.80 In
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,8 l plaintiffs maintained a
wrongful death action against a Florida county for failing to maintain a
stop sign and pavement markings.8 2 The Supreme Court of Oregon in
Brennen v. City of Eugene,8 3 addressed the issue of "whether a municipality
can be held liable in damages when its employee issues a taxicab license
to an applicant who does not possess the minimum liability insurance
required by city ordinance." '8 4 In Wilson v. Nepstad,8 5 plaintiffs asserted
that the City of Des Moines, Iowa had negligently breached statutory
duties relating to building and fire-safety inspection.8 6
In each case, the governmental entities asserted the public duty
doctrine in their defense.8 7 Similarly, all three jurisdictions rejected the
public duty doctrine.8 8 As in Adams and Coffey, the courts reasoned that
79. Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 1979) (trend is toward
liability for failure to provide general policy or fire protection).
80. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 1979) (plaintiff alleged county was liable in wrongful death action because
county failed to maintain stop sign and pavement markings); Wilson v. Nepstad,
282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (plaintiffs alleged city negligently breached build-
ing and fire inspection duties); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591
P.2d 719 (1979) (plaintiff alleged city negligent in issuing taxicab license to un-
derinsured company).
81. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
82. Id. at 1013. In Commercial Carrier, petitioners, a trucking company and
its insurance carrier, sought indemnity and contribution for the negligent failure
of the county to maintain a stop sign and pavement markings at an intersection.
Id. The plaintiffs alleged this failure resulted in a collision between petitioner's
tractor-trailer truck and decedent's automobile. Id.
83. 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979).
84. Id. at 403, 591 P.2d at 721. In Brennen, plaintiff alleged that the city was
negligent in issuing a taxicab license to an underinsured company precluding
him from collecting the full amount of damages awarded to him for injuries sus-
tained in a collision. Id. at 404, 591 P.2d at 721-22. The Oregon Supreme
Court found a municipal ordinance created a duty on the part of the city's licens-
ing agent to use reasonable care in performing his function and to avoid creat-
ing a foreseeable risk of harm to others. Id. at 411, 591 P.2d at 725. Therefore,
the city's licensing agent had a duty to ensure that the applicant for a taxicab
license possessed the minimum of liability insurance required by law before issu-
ing a license. Id.
85. 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979).
86. Id. at 666. In Wilson, plaintiffs alleged that statutes and ordinances re-
lating to building codes, occupancy permits, and fire regulations required the
city to perform inspections and compel compliance. Id. Plaintiffs further as-
serted that the city breached these duties when the city negligently inspected the
premises of an apartment building and issued a certificate warranting it safe for
human habitation. Id. Five months after the inspection, a fire destroyed the
building, killing several individuals who were residents or guests in the building.
Id.
87. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1013; Brennen, 285 Or. at 408, 591 P.2d
at 723-24; Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 666.
88. See Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015; Brennen, 285 Or. at 411, 591
P.2d at 725; Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 668-69. It should be noted, however, that the
Commercial Carrier, Wilson and Brennen decisions abrogating the public duty doc-
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the public duty doctrine reimposed sovereign immunity contravening
the intent of their respective state legislatures.
8 9
trine are distinguishable from cases in which nonfeasance is alleged. See Brennen,
285 Or. at 409, 591 P.2d at 724. Police nonfeasance cases deal with a failure of
public officers to act at all, which "involve considerations quite different from
[those in cases such as Commercial Carrier, Wilson and Brennen] where an act is
alleged to have been performed and performed negligently." Id. Where an act
is alleged to have been performed negligently, as a general rule, the Brennen
court held that "one is held to a higher standard of care when he affirmatively
acts than when he fails to act." Id.
Thus, the question arises whether these jurisdictions would similarly dis-
pose of the public duty doctrine defense to governmental culpability in the po-
lice nonfeasance context. One such state court confronted with this issue has
completely abrogated the public duty doctrine in both contexts. See City of
Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Alaska 1985) (relying on abrogation
of public duty doctrine in Adams v. State).
In City of Kotzebue, the court found the city liable for breaching a duty to
protect a stabbing victim after the perpetrator called the police prior to the at-
tack, identified himself, disclosed his location, and informed police he was going
to kill a friend. 702 P.2d at 1310. The court found that the police purposely
delayed responding to the call. Id. The court refused to recognize the public
duty doctrine as a defense stating it had rejected the doctrine in the negligent
public inspection case of Adams v. State, and declined to resurrect it. Id. at 1311.
For a further discussion of the Adams case, see supra notes 66-72 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of the distinction in the application of the
public duty doctrine in cases of police nonfeasance as opposed to police negli-
gence, see supra note 9.
89. See Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015; Brennen, 285 Or. at 409-10,
591 P.2d at 724; Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 668-69. The Supreme Court of New
Mexico discarded the public duty doctrine for similar reasons in Schear v. Board
of County Commissioners, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984). The plaintiff in
Schear was brutally tortured and raped due to the alleged failure of the sheriff's
agents to respond to a call for assistance. Id. at 672, 687 P.2d at 729. The court
of appeals upheld the trial court's application of the public duty doctrine, dis-
missing Schear's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Id. at 672, 687 P.2d at 729. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeal's decision. Id. The court held
that the legislative abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity had like-
wise abolished the public duty doctrine in that jurisdiction. See id at 673-74, 687
P.2d at 730-32.
The Schear court noted it had abolished sovereign immunity in an earlier
case. Id. at 674-75, 687 P.2d at 731 (citing Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d
1153 (1975)). The court further observed, however, that while the legislature
had enacted a statute reestablishing sovereign immunity as to certain govern-
mental employees, it had not "exclude[d] peace officers from liability while per-
forming 'any public duty.'" 101 N.M. at 674, 687 P.2d at 731 (construing N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-2,-12 (1977)). Therefore, the court concluded that the legis-
lature had intended police agencies to be subject to the same standard of liabil-
ity as citizens. See 101 N.M. at 677, 687 P.2d at 734.
Thereafter, relying on the same rationale, Wyoming abrogated the doctrine
in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). In DeWald, the decedent's estate
brought an action against the state for his death caused by a drunk driving sus-
pect being pursued by police. Id. at 645. The driver ignored repeated attempts
by highway patrol officers to stop him through use of their red lights and sirens,
and a high speed pursuit ensued. Id. The pursuit ended when the drunken
[Vol. 32: p. 505
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In Ryan v. State,90 Arizona overruled its prior case law and joined
the trend of states abrogating the public duty doctrine. 9 1 In Ryan, plain-
tiff brought an action for the negligent state supervision of an escaped
inmate who robbed and shot the plaintiff.92 The basis for the court's
decision was that the public duty doctrine was merely a replacement for
the previously rejected doctrine of sovereign immunity in a "bright new
word-package." 93
The Ryan court also addressed the government's contentions that
discarding the public duty doctrine would cause the public treasury to
become insolvent, or that "the government would come to a standstill
because its agents will be afraid to act."' 94 Upon examination, the court
promptly rejected such arguments. 95 Purchasing insurance, the court
stated, would adequately protect against the spectre of governmental in-
solvency from adverse negligence judgments.9 6 The court further
noted that police officers had continued performing their duties long
driver struck a vehicle stopped at a red light, killing plaintiff's decedent instanta-
neously. Id.
Following the reasoning of the aforementioned cases, the court found that
the legislature's abolition of sovereign immunity made the public duty doctrine
no longer viable in Wyoming. Id. at 653. In DeWald, the court abolished the
public duty doctrine stating it "was in essence a form of sovereign immunity and
viable when sovereign immunity was the rule. The legislature has abolished sov-
ereign immunity in this area. The public duty [doctrine], if it ever was recog-
nized in Wyoming, is no longer viable." Id.
90. 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982).
91. Id. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599. In rejecting the public duty doctrine in
Ryan, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly overruled one of the most fre-
quently cited cases supporting the public duty doctrine, Massengill v. Yuma
County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969).
92. Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 308, 656 P.2d at 597. In Ryan, a seventeen-year-old
inmate with a long history of criminal behavior and three previous escapes ab-
sconded from the Arizona Youth Center, allegedly by reason of grossly negli-
gent supervision. Id. The youth subsequently engaged in the robbery of a
convenience market and shot the plaintiff point-blank with a sawed-off shotgun.
Id.
93. Id. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598. The Ryan court noted that appellee's pre-
dictions of public treasury insolvency and governmental fear to act in the face of
liability had arisen before in regard to the abrogation of sovereign immunity. Id.
The court found appellee's contentions meritless in view of the fact that "Ari-
zona [had] survived" insolvency and that "law enforcement officers continued to
perform their duties long after sovereign immunity's demise." Id. at 309, 656
P.2d at 598-99. The court further found that in addition to purchasing liability
insurance, the preservation of statutory immunity for state officers' discretionary
acts "done 'in good faith without wanton disregard of [their] statutory duties' "
provided continued protection against the "horribles pictured by appellee." Id.
at 310, 656 P.2d at 599.
96. Id. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599. The court stated that the legislature had
clearly contemplated that the state would be liable for the negligent acts of its
agents. Id. Therefore, the court "assumed" the legislature would already have
purchased liability insurance, shielding the state from serious financial loss. Id.
NOTE
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since a 1947 decision affirming a judgment against a state police officer
for negligence. 97 Therefore, the concern that liability would frighten
individuals to act in their official capacities was held to be unfounded in
reality. 98
In Leake v. Cain,99 Colorado became the most recent state to abro-
gate the public duty doctrine. In Leake, two minor brothers attended a
large outdoor teenage party in Commerce City, Colorado.1 00 The eld-
est, Ralph Crowe, drank a substantial quantity of alcohol over the course
of the evening.' 0 1 When he became disruptive, Ralph Crowe was hand-
cuffed and taken into custody by Commerce City police officers attempt-
ing to disperse the teenagers. 10 2 The police, however, later released
Ralph Crowe to the custody of his younger brother. 10 3 Later that eve-
ning, Ralph Crowe struck several individuals with his car, killing two. 104
Respondents thereafter filed a wrongful death suit against the five Com-
merce City police officers responding to the party, and Commerce City
(petitioners).1 0 5
97. Id. at 309, 656 P.2d at 599 (citing Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185
P.2d 304 (1947) (affirming judgment against highway patrol officer for negli-
gently striking plaintiff's vehicle while responding to a call)). The Ryan court
further noted that a state statute provided substantial protection to state officers,
agents, and employees from personal liability for discretionary acts done in
"good faith without wanton disregard of [their] statutory duties." Id. at 310,
656 P.2d at 599 (citing ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-621(G) (1985)).
98. See Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 309, 656 P.2d at 599.
99. 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
100. Id. at 153. The size of the party was estimated at "between thirty and
sixty youths." Id. at 153 n.1. Both brothers were minors when these events
transpired. See id. at 153-54. Ralph Crowe was eighteen years of age at the time
of the accident. Id. at 153. His brother Eddie Crowe was seventeen years of age.
Id. at 154.
101. Id. at 153 & n.2. The facts of Leake indicate Ralph Crowe consumed
eight cups of beer and three cups of alcoholic punch. Id. at 153. Each cup held
approximately four to five ounces of liquid. Id. at 153 n.2.
102. Id. at 154. The Commerce City police officers were dispatched to dis-
perse the party in response to a neighbor's complaint. Id. at 153-54.
103. Id. at 154. Eddie Crowe requested that his brother be released to him.
Id. He promised the officers he would drive Ralph home. Id. After observing
that Eddie Crowe appeared sober and had a valid driver's license, the officers
agreed to permit Ralph Crowe to leave the party with his brother. Id.
However, rather than proceeding home, the brothers intended on returning
to the relocated party. See id. After stopping to purchase some cookies at a con-
venience store, Ralph Crowe assumed control of the vehicle. Id.
104. Id. Ralph Crowe's blood alcohol content was .20 grams per one hun-
dred milliliters of blood, "well in excess of the legal presumption of intoxifica-
tion in Colorado." Id. A person is presumed legally intoxicated under Colorado
law if his blood alcohol content is "0.10 or more grams of alcohol per one hun-
dred milliliters of blood." Id. at 154 n.3 (citing 17 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-
1202(l)(a) (1984)).
105. 720 P.2d at 154. Respondents' complaint alleged that the officers:
(1) had reason to believe that Ralph Crowe was intoxicated at the time he was
detained and were therefore negligent in failing to take him into custody;
(2) were negligent in releasing Ralph Crowe to his younger brother; (3) should
526 [Vol. 32: p. 505
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Presented with the issue of whether the Commerce City Police De-
partment could invoke the public duty doctrine defense,' 0 6 the court
chose to join the trend ofjurisdictions abrogating the public duty doc-
trine and applied traditional tort analysis to the case.' 0 7 The Leake court
criticized the public duty doctrine for its "harsh effect on plaintiffs who
would be entitled to recover for their injuries but for the public status of
their tortfeasor."' 10 8. The court further found that application of the
public duty doctrine would be inappropriate where the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity had been abrogated by case law or by the
legislature. 109
have foreseen that Ralph Crowe would drive an automobile in an intoxicated
condition, and that injury to the public was a foreseeable consequence of their
failure to arrest Ralph Crowe. Id.
106. 720 P.2d at 155. After a hearing, the trial court, applying the public
duty doctrine, granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Id. The peti-
tioners contended that "the duty of the officers to enforce the law was a public
duty, and that the officers' negligence, if any, was not actionable because they
did not owe a special duty to the respondents' decedents." Id. at 154. There-
fore, the trial court concluded that the Commerce City police officers' exercise
of discretion in releasing Ralph Crowe had not created a special duty to respon-
dents' decedents. Id.
However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that "(1) the decision ...
to release Ralph Crowe was not a discretionary act and (2) denying immunity
would not unduly interfere with the governmental function." Id. at 154-55. The
court of appeals "inexplicably" did not address whether the trial court appropri-
ately relied upon the public duty doctrine. Id. at 157 n.7. Thereafter, the Com-
merce City petitioners were granted certiorari by the Supreme Court of Colorado,
who reversed and remanded to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate
the trial court's order granting summary judgment. Id. at 153.
107. Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted). For a complete list of jurisdictions
rejecting the public duty doctrine, see supra note 12.
108. 720 P.2d at 159 (citing Adams, 555 P.2d at 235; Commerical Carrier, 371
So. 2d at 1010).
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Alaska criticized the public duty doctrine
because it would "result in finding no duty" because of the public status of the
tortfeasor, even though "they were foreseeable victims and a private defendant
would have owed such a duty." Adams, 555 P.2d at 241-42.
Similarly, in Commercial Carrier, the Florida Supreme Court criticized the
harsh effects of the public duty doctrine stating:
[W]e believe it to be circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of
action exists for a negligent act or omission by an agent of the state ...
where the duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but
not to any particular person .... By less kind commentators, [the pub-
lic duty doctrine] has been characterized as a theory which results in a
duty to none where there is a duty to all.
Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015.
109. Leake, 720 P.2d at 159-60 (citations omitted). The Leake court's rea-
soning in this regard is similar to that of other courts. For a discussion of other
decisions which have held that the public duty doctrine is not appropriate where
the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been abrogated, see supra notes 22-23
and accompanying text. The rationale behind these decisions is that the concept
of sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine are so closely related that
continued application of the public duty doctrine after sovereign immunity's
elimination would be contrary to the policy behind the abolition of sovereign
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The Leake court rejected the argument that the government would
be severely interfered with or suffer an incapacitating financial impact if
the public duty doctrine was abolished. 10 After noting that these same
policy rationales had been found meritless when used to justify sover-
eign immunity, the court reasoned they should likewise be rejected as
justifications for the public duty doctrine."' Finally, the Leake court
concluded that "the most persuasive reason for the abandonment of the
public duty doctrine was that it created needless confusion" in the law
and resulted in uneven and inadequate results.' 12
immunity. See, e.g., Leake, 720 P.2d at 160 (effect of public duty doctrine is iden-
tical to that of sovereign immunity).
110. Leake, 720 P.2d at 159. The court stated that these rationales were
asserted to justify sovereign immunity. Id.
111. Id. at 159 (citing Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982);
Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983)
(Utter, J., concurring)).
112. Id. (citing Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); J & B
Dev. Co., v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 229, 669 P.2d 468, 474 (1983) (Utter, J.,
concurring)); see also Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note
7, at 341 ("[T]he public duty doctrine ... is riddled with numerous and unpre-
dictable exceptions [which] serve only to thwart the equitable purposes underly-
ing the abrogation of sovereign immunity."); Note, Court of Claims Act, supra note
11, at 209 (cases applying public duty doctrine in New York "have frustrated this
area of the law and have rendered prospective liability unpredictable").
The Leake court noted that the burdens of establishing a duty using "con-
ventional tort principles, such as foreseeability" and proof of proximate cause
provided sufficient protection against excessive governmental liability. Leake,
720 P.2d at 160. Accordingly, the court rejected the public duty doctrine and
determined the case utilizing conventional tort principles. Id. The court then
turned to an analysis of whether the Commerce City police officers owed a duty
to respondents' decedents. Id. The court held a duty to avoid harm exists when
"a person should reasonably foresee that his act, or failure to act, will involve an
unreasonable risk of harm." Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965). The court noted, however, that absent a special
relation between the actor and the victim there is no duty to prevent a third
person from harming another. 720 P.2d at 160 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
The court found that although the officers had a duty to prevent Ralph
Crowe from harming others while he was in police custody, the officers had dis-
charged their duty by restraining Crowe until he calmed down. 720 P.2d at 161
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965) (duty of those in charge
of person with dangerous propensities)). Thus, the Leake court concluded that
the officers' duty "began and ended at the party" and therefore was not owed to
respondents' decedents. 720 P.2d at 161.
Additionally, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of qualified
immunity. Id. at 163. Despite the abrogation of absolute sovereign immunity,
the court noted that "[a] public official performing discretionary acts within the
scope of his office enjoys qualified immunity. He is protected against civil liabil-
ity if his conduct is not willful, malicious or intended to cause harm." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). The Leake court concluded that the Commerce City police
officers were protected against liability by official immunity because the decision
to take Ralph Crowe into custody was a discretionary function protected. by offi-
cial immunity. 720 P.2d at 164.
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It is submitted that the drastic social and economic changes that
have taken place since the public duty doctrine's birth in the nineteenth
century warrant that it follow the doctrine of sovereign immunity into
the "dustheap of history."' 13 Many jurisdictions abrogated the doctrine
of sovereign immunity because of the degree of injustice it caused.' 14
Yet despite their acknowledgment of the inherent problems of sovereign
immunity, and subsequent abandonment of the doctrine, many jurisdic-
tions continue to impose the functional equivalent of sovereign immu-
nity by recognition and application of the public duty doctrine.' 1 5
Although the public duty doctrine differs from sovereign immunity the-
oretically, the doctrine continues to place the burden of the injury en-
tirely upon the innocent victim.' 1 6
As previously noted, proponents of the public duty doctrine cite
two principle justifications in defense of the doctrine's continued viabil-
113. See Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 521, 456 P.2d 376, 379
(1969) (en banc) ("[T]his Court in the most unquestionable terms relegated that
archaic doctrine [of sovereign immunity] to the dustheap of history.").
114. See Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968
(1971) (prospectively overruling doctrine of sovereign immunity as defense to
tort claims against counties, school districts, and state).
In 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
It is almost incredible that in this modern age of comparative socio-
logical enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval absolutism sup-
posed to be implicit in the maxim, "the King can do no wrong," should
exempt the various branches of the government from liability for their
torts, and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful
acts of government should be imposed upon the single individual who
suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire community
constituting the government, where it can be borne without hardship
upon any individual, and where it justly belongs.
McAndrew v. Mulachuk, 33 N.J. 172, 191, 162 A.2d 820, 830-31 (1960) (action
by minor and parents against municipality and reserve police officer for negli-
gent shooting in course of officer's duty) (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47
N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480, 482 (1943)).
115. See, e.g., Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598 (public duty doctrine is
merely sovereign immunity "in a bright new word-package"); Leake, 720 P.2d at
160 ("[W]hether or not the public duty [doctrine] is a function of sovereign
immunity, the effect of the rule is identical to that of sovereign immunity.").
116. See, e.g., Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7,
at 341 ("[T]he [public duty] doctrine remains a court's most potent weapon in
conserving public funds by imposing the cost of government negligence upon a
few hapless individuals."); Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 834 ("These mis-
takes [of police negligence] should not be borne solely by the unfortunate few
upon whom the injuries fortuitously fall."); Note, Court of Claims Act, supra note 7,
at 201 & n.68 ("The limitation on municipal liability imposed by [the public duty
doctrine] has the unfortunate side effect of leaving innocent victims without re-
dress."); Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 541 ("If govern-
ment agents are negligent, the innocent victims of their negligence should not
have to bear the cost.").
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ity.117 The first justification is that abrogation of the public duty doc-
trine will unduly interfere with governmental operations. l1 s Courts
relying on this justification have feared that expanding liability would
deter individuals from serving as public officers,' '9 and that those serv-
ing in public office would avoid undertaking activities which might ex-
pose them to liability.
2 0
It is submitted, however, that imposing liability on police merely
provides an incentive for law enforcement officers to perform their pre-
existing job responsibilities adequately.'21 Additionally, it is submitted
that even if the public duty doctrine is abrogated, police officers are suf-
ficiently protected from meritless suits by the conventional tort analysis
which would supplant the public duty doctrine. 12
2
117. For a discussion of policy justifications for courts' application of the
public duty doctrine, see supra note 18 & infra notes 118-120.
118. See, e.g., Adams, 555 P.2d at 242 (stating concern of public duty doc-
trine is that "tort suits must not hinder the state in its process of governing");
Leake, 720 P.2d at 159 (stating interference with governmental operations is as-
serted in defense of public duty doctrine by its proponents); Chambers-Castanes
v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 291, 669 P.2d 451, 461 (1983) (Utter, J.,
concurring) (rationale defending public duty doctrine is "need to prevent hin-
drance of the governing process").
119. See Miller v. Ouray Elec. Light & Power Co., 18 Colo. App. 131, 139,
70 P. 447, 449 (1902) (citation omitted) (" '[N]o sane man would assume the
position [of county commissioner] with such a liability attached.' ").
120. See, e.g., Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598 ("[w]e are.., told...
government will come to a standstill because its agents will be afraid to act");
Stigler v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 2d 20, 268 N.E.2d 26 (1971) (expressing
concern of court that expanding liability would deter municipalities from enact-
ing ordinances designed to protect the general public); Dufrene v. Guarino, 343
So. 2d 1097 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 343 So. 2d 1068 (1977) (liability for dam-
ages due to failure to enforce regulations might compel government to repeal
regulations depriving public of their benefits); Dinsky v. Town of Framington,
386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982) (abrogation of public duty doctrine would
cause city tremendous exposure to liability and dissuade municipalities from en-
acting regulations designed for public's protection and welfare); see also Stone &
Rinker,Jr., Governmental Liabilityfor Negligent Inspections, 57 TUL. L. REV. 328, 330-
31 & n. 15 (1982) (stating fear that municipalities will be deterred from undertak-
ing inspection is a concern offered in support of public duty doctrine); Note,
State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7, at 341; Note, A Unified
Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 541.
121. See Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 833 & n.54.
122. See, e.g., City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Alaska
1985) (protection of state from becoming insurer of all private activity and pre-
serving ability to govern is better protected by traditional tort concept of duty);
Leake, 720 P.2d at 160 (benefits of public duty doctrine are more properly real-
ized by applying traditional negligence law); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d
664, 671 (Iowa 1979) (following abrogation of public duty doctrine "there is no
liability for the acts of an officer or employee unless there is negligence"); see also
Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 834-35 & n.65 ("[u]nder any negligence
scheme, plaintiffs would still be required to establish breach of duty and causa-
tion"); Note, A Unified Approach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 542 (stating that
common law principle of foreseeability would work well in place of public duty
doctrine).
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In conventional tort analysis the plaintiff must still demonstrate a
duty owed, a breach of that duty, and establish causation.123 The extent
of a duty owed by police to an individual is a question for the court to
decide under policy considerations.' 2 4 The general rule of negligence
is that where a person should reasonably foresee that his or her act, or
failure to act, involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another, there is
a duty to avoid such harm. 12 5 In cases of police nonfeasance, however,
there is "no duty to prevent a third person from harming another, ab-
sent a special relationship between the actor and the victim.' 26 It is
submitted that the "special relationship" standard of traditional negli-
123. Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599; Schear, 101 N.M. at 676, 687
P.2d at 733; Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 344 Pa. Super. 9, 495
A.2d 963 (1985); see also W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 30, at 164-65.
In Leake, the court stated:
The fear of excessive governmental liability is largely baseless in view
of the fact that a plaintiff . . . must establish the existence of a duty
using conventional tort principles, such as foreseeability, in the same
manner as if the defendant were a private entity .... Another hurdle
the plaintiff must surmount ... to recover is proof of proximate cause.
The traditional burdens of proof tied to tort law adequately limit gov-
ernmental liability without resort to the artificial distinctions engen-
dered by the public duty [doctrine].
720 P.2d at 160 (citing City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Alaska
1985)).
Similarly, the Schear court noted that "[s]trict liability for failure to ade-
quately perform a duty is not imposed by this opinion." Schear, 101 N.M. at 676,
686 P.2d at 733. "Liability will not attach until all the elements of negligence
have been proved, including duty, breach of duty, and proximate cause." Id.
(emphasis added).
124. Brennen, 285 Or. at 406, 591 P.2d at 722. The Brennen court observed
that duty was "simply 'an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion.' " Id. (citation omitted); see also W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 53, at 356-57.
"A duty," the authors state,
is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is
always the same-to conform to the legal standard of reasonable con-
duct in light of the apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or not
do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty.
Id.
125. Adams, 555 P.2d at 240 n.10 (citing Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v.
Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1973); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75,
154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)); Leake, 720 P.2d at 160 (citing Metro-
politan Gas Repair Serv. Inc. v. Kulick, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1981); Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971)); Griesenbeck v.
Walker, 199 N.J. Super. 132, 488 A.2d 1038, cert. denied, 101 N.J. 264, 501 A.2d
932 (1985); Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Transp. v. Phillips, 87 Pa. Commw.
504, 488 A.2d 77 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1977).
126. See, e.g., Leake, 720 P.2d at 160 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 315 (1965)).
For a discussion of "special relationships" between police and individuals in
the context of the public duty doctrine, see supra notes 8 & 38-60 and accompa-
nying text.
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gence law provides adequate protection for police officers by making
liability a question of whether police assumed a duty to the plaintiff,' 27
rather than solely upon their status as public officers. 128 Further, even if
the plaintiff can establish a duty, since interaction between the police
and crime victims is commonly highly attenuated, plaintiffs would have a
difficult burden substantiating that police nonfeasance was the proxi-
mate cause of their alleged damages. 12 9
It is further submitted that many legislatures have not shared the
concern that individuals will be deterred from seeking public office or
undertaking governmental activities. In those jurisdictions where sover-
eign immunity has been abolished,' 3 0 the legislatures have manifested
their intent to have public entities treated like private individuals with
regard to tort claims. 13 ' Furthermore, individuals such as doctors, law-
yers, and entities such as partnerships and corporations, have long been
127. See Melendez v. Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 65, 466 A.2d 1060,
1064 (1983). The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, for example, stated that in
order to demonstrate a "special relationship" between the plaintiff and police, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that police were: "1) aware of the individual's particu-
lar situation or unique status, 2) had knowledge of the potential for the particu-
lar harm which the individual suffered, and 3) voluntarily assumed, in light of that
knowledge, to protect the individual from the precise harm which was occa-
sioned." Id. (emphasis in original).
128. For a discussion of criticism of the public duty doctrine for its empha-
sis on the public status of the tortfeasor in denying a cause of action, see supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
129. See Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379
(1982). In Shore, the complaint alleged that a township police officer had negli-
gently released a drunken driver, who subsequently struck and killed plaintiff's
decedent later that day. Id. at 1380. Addressing the issue of causation the court
held that the special duty required to maintain an action could not be estab-
lished merely by the fact that someone with whom the official had prior contact
subsequently injured the plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 1383. There-
fore, the court dismissed the action under the public duty doctrine due to the
absence of proof of a special relationship owed to the plaintiff's decedent. See id.
at 1383-84; see also Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D. 2d 751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615(1972) (reversing jury verdict against police for failing to arrest drunken driver
who subsequently caused accident citing insufficient evidence of causation as
principle grounds), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.2d 684, 296 N.E.2d 257, 343 N.Y.S.2d 361
(1973); Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 835-36 & nn.66-70 ("cases litigated
to date suggest that causation in particular would constitute a major hurdle").
130. For a discussion of jurisdictions abrogating the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
131. See Leake, 720 P.2d at 159. A foremost policy consideration of courts
abrogating the public duty doctrine is the legislature's intent to have the state
treated as a private individual for purposes of determining liability. See, e.g., Ad-
ams, 555 P.2d at 241-42; Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599; Leake, 720 P.2d
at 160; Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015; Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 671; Bren-
nen, 285 Or. at 411, 591 P.2d at 725; see also 3 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 25.06, at 458-59 (1958) ("Surely when a court construes away such
an unequivocal statutory provision [abrogating sovereign immunity], thejudicial
responsibility for governmental responsibility is very grave indeed."). For fur-
ther discussion of state statutes' effects upon abrogation of the public duty doc-
trine, see supra notes 22-23, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32: p. 505
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held liable for the tortious conduct of their employees under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. 13 2 Yet medical, business and law schools have
not become extinct, nor ceased to find willing applicants due to a fear of
liability. Instead, it is submitted that emphasis should be, and is, cor-
rectly placed on avoiding liability by hiring employees more carefully,
training public officers more thoroughly, and investigating possible
criminal activity more completely. 133
Furthermore, the concern that public entities will be unable to func-
tion absent immunity has not proven to be historically accurate where
imposition of liability has been allowed for other governmental activi-
ties. 13 4 For example, as the Adams court noted, Alaska has not stopped
designing or maintaining highways even though the court allowed suits
against the state for negligent design or maintenance of highways.'
35
The second and most basic rationale for the public duty doctrine's
application is simply preservation of municipal funds. 136 While some
132. See, e.g., In re Mifflin Chem. Corp., 123 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
315 U.S. 815 (1941) (under Pennsylvania law responsibility of employer for acts
of agent is imposed under general rule of respondeat superior); Poutre v. Saunders,
19 Wash. 2d 561, 143 P.2d 554 (1943) (holding respondeat superior is common law
duty of every person to conduct affairs so as not to injure another, whether or
not in managing such affairs he or she employs servants or agents); see generally
W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 70, at 501-03 (discussing master's liability for ser-
vant's torts).
133. See THE TRAFFIC INSTITUTE, CIVIL LIABILITY AND THE POLICE 56 (1982).
The authors of the treatise state:
Once access to the legal system.., is obtained, the officer or adminis-
trator is usually put to the burden of defending his conduct or prac-
tices. If the police personnel involved have performed their duties and
responsibilities in accordance with the legal precepts which are applica-
ble to a given situation, the probability of success within the legal sys-
tem is practically assured.
The key to success in avoiding civil liability is training, guidance
and discipline. These are the responsibilities of the police administra-
tor and obligations on the part of the subordinates.
Id.
134. See, e.g., Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598. Addressing defend-
ant's contention that the abrogation of the public duty doctrine would make
government "come to a standstill" due to fear of liability, the Ryan court posited
that the same dire predictions were made before the court rejected the sover-
eign immunity doctrine, yet Arizona survived. Id. The court further noted that
subsequent to sovereign immunity's demise "law enforcement officers continue
to perform their duties." Id.
135. Adams, 555 P.2d at 243-44. The court stated that the state did not
terminate highway design and maintenance despite the "greater risk of liability
in that area." Id. at 244.
136. See, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376,
381 (1969) (en banc) ("The extent of potential liability to which [abrogation of
the public duty doctrine] could lead is staggering."); see also Stone & Rinker,
supra note 120 at 328, 330 & n.14 (1982) ("The threat of fiscal disaster [is an]
additional concern[] offered to justify governmental immunity [under the public
duty doctrine]. ... ); Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra
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courts have openly confessed their fear of burdensome liability as a ra-
tionale for denying recovery, 13 7 a majority of courts that apply the pub-
lic duty doctrine cloak their fear of excessive liability by consistently
applying the public duty doctrine, and merely concluding no duty was
owed the plaintiffs. 13 8
It is submitted, however, that this concern is unfounded and sophis-
tic upon analysis. Thus far, no state government or municipality has
become insolvent due to an adverse common law tort judgment.' 3 9 To
the contrary, an economic analysis suggests public social welfare and
governmental efficiency can be maximized by the encouragement of
governmental amenability to tort actions. 14 ° Moreover, why should the
note 7, at 344-49 (discussing the "myth of the crippling judgment" against gov-
ernmental entities).
137. See, e.g., Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (La. Ct. App.
1977) ("[tlhe agencies rightfully point to the immeasurable and inevitably enor-
mous impact on the public if all agencies are held liable"), cert. denied, 343 So. 2d
1069 (1977); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 582, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1968) ("Before such extension of [financial] responsibil-
ities should be dictated by the indirect imposition of tort liabilities, there should
be a legislative determination that that should be the scope of public responsi-
bility.") (citations omitted).
138. See Stone & Rinker, supra note 120, at 328, 341 & n.54 (1982) ("The
public duty doctrine has often been used by courts primarily to disguise the ac-
tual reason for refusing to grant relief against the government-the fear of ex-
cessive liability. ... ). Courts applying the public duty doctrine typically do
not include policy rationales in their decisions, but simply deny recovery on the
basis that no duty was owed the individual. See id. at 322; cf. Williams v. State, 34
Cal. 3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137 (1983) (highway patrol officer had
no duty to investigate accident and preserve evidence for civil litigation under
public duty doctrine); Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520, 423 A.2d 165 (1979)
(inquiry limited as to whether police officer who witnessed but failed to stop
public disturbance had created special duty to plaintiff's decedent); Namauu v.
Honolulu, 62 Haw. 358, 614 P.2d 943 (1980) (police department had no duty to
individuals to apprehend escaped mental patient); Huey v. Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361,
243 N.E.2d 214 (1968) (police had no duty to protect individual members of
racial minority where not informed of danger); Hendrix v. Topeka, 231 Kan.
113, 643 P.2d 129 (1982) (police officer assumed no duty to individual removed
from mental hospital); Frankfort Variety, Inc. v. Frankfort, 552 S.W.2d 653 (Ky.
1977) (city had no duty to individuals for fire loss under public duty doctrine);
Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (1981) (state had no knowledge of dangerous
conditions that would create duty to individual plaintiffs); Melendez v. Philadel-
phia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983) (court found no evidence that
police had assumed duty of protection to shooting victim during racial incident).
For a discussion of the special relationship exception to the public duty doc-
trine, see supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
139. Letter from Sean F. Mooney, Senior Vice President, Insurance Infor-
mation Institute to John McMillan (Feb. 26, 1987). According to the most re-
cent information available to the Insurance Information Institute "no city has
actually gone bankrupt" due to adverse tort liability judgment. Id. However,
the Institute cautions that municipalities have faced situations where the initial
judgments were higher than the available financial resources. Id.
140. Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 835. It has been suggested that
the economic and social benefits created by the recognition of police liability
provide a "cogent argument" for discarding the public duty doctrine. Id.; see also
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government be treated any differently with regard to liability than an
ordinary citizen? 14 1 If a governmental entity is so crippled by adverse
judgments that it borders on insolvency then, as a private individual or
entity, it is submitted that the government should either modify institu-
tional practices, 142 or replace those in positions of authority with indi-
viduals who can perform satisfactorily.14 3 The overwhelming number of
police agencies that perform their duties non-negligently demonstrate
that reasonable police protection is not an unrealistic expectation. 14
4
The government can further protect its resources by carrying liabil-
ity insurance, 14 5 or by imposing reasonable statutory limits on the size
Note, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 515
(1977) (presenting extensive economic model suggesting governmental effi-
ciency is maximized by amenability to tort actions).
141. See Adams, 555 P.2d at 242; Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 668. Since a private
individual's ability to pay a judgment is considered irrelevant for purposes of
determining liability, a government's ability to pay should likewise have no bear-
ing. See Stone & Rinker, supra note 120, at 541 & n.56 (the ability of government
to pay should have no bearing on tort liability).
142. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 209, 213-18 (1963) (discussing modification of institutional practices to
reduce incidence of actionable police negligence); Note, Police Liability, supra
note 7, at 823 (discussing evidence that institutional reforms effect significant
improvements in crime prevention).
143. See THE TRAFFIC INSTITUTE, CIVIL LIABILITY AND THE POLICE 30 (1982).
The first responsibility of an effective police administrator is ensuring that the
hiring process is adequate to screen out applicants who are not qualified to per-
form as police officers. Id. The administrator is further obliged "to ensure that
all employees who are subsequently determined to be incompetent or otherwise
unfit as officers are removed or brought in line with department policy." Id.
144. See Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Lawsuits Against Police
Skyrocket, Issue 7 (1980). For example, a study conducted by Americans for Ef-
fective Law Enforcement predicted a total of 26,000 lawsuits (of all types)
against police in 1980. Id. In 1979, the closest year to the study for which statis-
tics were available, there were some 580,269 police officers employed in the
United States at the state and local levels. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 183 (1981). Using simple arithme-
tic, this works out to only some 2.3 lawsuits per thousand police officers. The
number of lawsuits against police officers today may be even lower since "the
number of cases filed-including tort, contract, real property rights and small
claims cases-declined 4 percent between 1981 and 1984." N. Blodgett, Pre-
mium Hikes Stun Municipalities, A.B.A. J. 48,49 (July 1, 1986).
145. See, e.g., Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599 ("insurance should be
obtained by the state to protect it from financial loss in [cases where the state is
held liable for negligent acts of its agents]"); Brennen, 285 Or. at 408, 591 P.2d at
723 ("[M]unicipalities can further protect themselves by obtaining liability insur-
ance ...."); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 817, 539
P.2d 845, 849-50 (1975) (governmental entities too small to self insure usually
will purchase insurance like any private individual or corporation); see also Note,
Police Liability, supra note 7, at 844 ("with the availability of insurance the costs
[of governmental liability] may not be greatly burdensome"); Note, A Unified Ap-
proach to Tort Liability, supra note 7, at 541 (government is able to protect its
resources by carrying liability insurance). But cf. N. Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun
Municipalities, A.B.A. J. 48 (July 1, 1986) (discussing municipalities' concerns
over rising costs of liability insurance).
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of damage awards. 146 Although the current "insurance panic" raises
some concern about the ability of municipalities to obtain insurance, 14 7
it is submitted that neither tort systems allowing suit against municipali-
ties, nor the municipalities themselves are culpable for the difficulty in
obtaining reasonably priced liability insurance. 148
Regardless, it is submitted that the ability of the government to pay
a damage judgment should have no bearing on the judicial determina-
tion of liability. 14 9 As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated, the
"inadmissible plea of poverty"' 150 is not a proper subject for judicial
For a further discussion of municipal concerns about liability insurance, see
infra note 147, and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1986) (limiting individual tort claims
against state to $100,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-4 (West 1983) (aggre-
gate tort damages against state limited to $300,000 per individual); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51 § 154 (West Supp. 1987) ($1,000,000 limitation on any number of
tort claims against state arising out of single occurrence); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.270(1)(a) (limiting tort claims against state to $500,000 limit); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8553(b) (1982) (limiting amount recoverable from municipality in
tort claim to $500,000).
It should be noted, however, that these statutes have been attacked on fed-
eral and state constitutional grounds. Compare Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512
Pa. 129, 516 A.2d 306 (1986) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld damage lim-
itation provided in Pennsylvania's Political Subdivisions Torts Claims Act re-
stricting tort recovery to $500,000 aggregate damages arising from single
occurrence) with Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985) (statute limiting tort
damages against state ruled unconstitutional as invasion by legislature on funda-
mental right under state constitution to sue governmental entities for full legal
redress).
147. See, e.g., N. Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, A.B.A.J. 48 (July
1, 1986). The author states several reasons for the increased cost of municipal
tort liability insurance. Id. First, suits based on the Federal Civil Rights Act,
originally limited to cases of police brutality, have been drastically expanded
against cities. Id. Second, municipalities are frequently targeted as the "deep
pocket" in even extremely tenuous tort claims under the doctrine ofjoint and
several liability. Id. at 49. Third, the "rate wars" between insurance companies
trying to offer lower permium rates than their competitors ended following "rec-
ord insolvencies" of insurance companies in 1984. Id. at 50. Expanded con-
cepts of liability and greater difficulty for insurance companies in obtaining
reinsurance are listed as further causes of the greater expense of insurance for
municipalities. Id. at 50-5 1; see also Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter, Mar. 24,
1986, 1, 3 (discussing municipalities' concern about rising insurance costs.).
148. See also Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter, Mar. 24, 1986, 1,3 (quoting
Pennsylvania Local Government Commission Report, Nov. 1986). The Penn-
sylvania Local Government Commission recently concluded that neither the tort
system allowing suit against municipalities, nor the municipalities in the state
could be blamed for the problem of obtaining reasonably priced liability insur-
ance. Id.
149. For a discussion of why government's ability to pay a damage judg-
ment should not be considered in a judicial determination of liability, see infra
notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
150. Piechuk v. Maguziak, 82 N.H. 429, 135 A. 534 (1926); accord King v.
Starr, 43 Wash. 2d 115, 260 P.2d 351 (1953) (issue of whether defendant carries
liability insurance is immaterial for consideration by jury); see also Note, State Tort
Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, supra note 7, at 345 (discussing "plea of pov-
536
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consideration for it distorts and belies the supposedly impartial determi-
nation of factual and legal liability. 15 '
It is further submitted that equitable loss spreading further man-
dates the abrogation of the public duty doctrine. '52 It is suggested that
once the requirements of traditional negligence analysis are satisfied,
the municipality and police department should bear the burden of dam-
ages as opposed to the innocent victim,' 53 because even a small munici-
pality normally has financial resources far beyond those of a private
citizen. 154
Although the costs of governmental liability will be borne by the
public, it is submitted this is not unreasonable. Such cost spreading is
no more unreasonable than an increase in the price of a product to allow
a private company to spread a loss.' 55 Moreover, as the United States
Supreme Court has stated, since the public enjoys the benefits of gov-
ernment's activities, the public is ultimately responsible for its costs.
15 6
erty"); Note, Defendant Rebuts Inference of Insurance, 5 STAN. L. REV. 143 (1952)
(same).
151. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 201 (3d ed. 1984) (jury should decide
case "according to the facts and substantive law, rather than upon sympathy and
ability to pay"); cf. FED. R. EvID. 411 ("Evidence that a person was or was not
insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negli-
gently or otherwise wrongfully."). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 411
of the Federal Rules of Evidence conclude that knowledge of the presence or
absence of insurance "would induce juries to decide on improper grounds." Id.
at Advisory Committee Notes.
152. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) ("No
longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of liability; the principle of
equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of
official misconduct.").
153. See id. at 657 (stating that innocent individual harmed by the abuse of
government is more properly compensated by damages chargeable to popula-
tion as whole); see also Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 589, 240 N.E.2d
860, 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting) (stating true
costs of inadequate or incompetant police protection are hidden by charging
expenditures to victims of catastrophic loss rather than amongst the community
that had power to prevent crime through its agent municipality); see generally W.
KEETON, supra note 6, § 85, at 608-09 (discussing fault principles of tort law in
American legal system).
154. See Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 834 (costs of governmental
negligence should not be borne solely by fortuitous victims since governmental
defendants generally possess superior loss-bearing capacity).
155. See, e.g., McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
In McAndrew, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that "the public's willing-
ness to assume the normally incidental costs of carrying out its enterprises
through municipal corporations is no less than its insistence that private corpo-
rations bear the costs of their business activities." Id. at 192-93, 163 A.2d at 831
(citing Green, Freedom of Litigation (III), 38 ILL. L. REV. 355, 378 (1944)).
156. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980). In Owen, the
police chief of the City of Independence brought an action against the city claim-
ing his rights had been violated by his dismissal without notice or due process.
Id. at 630. The court of appeals found the petitioner's rights had been violated
under the Federal Civil Rights Act, but upheld the district court's dismissal find-
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Furthermore, public indignation usually accompanies a tax increase of
any kind. It is submitted that the public fury accompanying a preventable
tax increase, necessitated by adverse police nonfeasance judgments,
would provide a powerful incentive for an agency to reform its practices
adequately. 157
It should be emphasized, however, that abrogation of the public
duty doctrine is not intended to be a malicious attack on law enforce-
ment. Police officers are human beings faced with a difficult job, and to
expect perfection is unrealistic and unfair. In light of this, most jurisdic-
tions that have discarded the public duty doctrine continue to reserve a
qualified immunity for discretionary acts done in good faith without
wanton disregard of the officer's statutory duties. 5 ' Therefore, upon
abrogation of the public duty doctrine, officers in jurisdictions which
have reserved qualified immunity for discretionary acts of public officials
are required to do no more than to perform a preexisting or assumed
duty.
Moreover, even if a jurisdiction has not enacted a statutory qualified
immunity for discretionary acts of public officials, there is still no valid
reason to cling to the antiquated public duty doctrine. Although the
fear that abolition of the public duty doctrine will require a municipality
to incur greater costs and will interfere with the discretion of police 159 is
ing the respondents were entitled to qualified immunity from liability based on
the good faith of the officials. Id. at 634. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed, holding that a municipality has no immunity under the Federal
Civil Rights Act. Id. at 638 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1983).
157. For a discussion of how and why the municipalities should modify
their practices, see supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Ryan, 134 Ariz. at 310, 656 P.2d at 599 (construing ARxz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-621(G) (1985)); Leake, 720 P.2d at 163 (citing Trimble v. City
and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985) (applying common law quali-
fied immunity)); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 1979) (constru-
ing IOWA CODE ANN. § 613 A.4(3) (1986)); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 647
(Wyo. 1986) (quoting Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1109 (Wyo. 1982) (citing
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (applying common law qualified immu-
nity))); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D(3) (1979). The treatise
states:
A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is
not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if
(a) he is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discretion-
ary function,
(b) he is privileged and does not exceed or abuse the privilege, or
(c) his conduct was not tortious because he was not negligent in
the performance of his responsibility.
Id.
159. See Shore, 187 Conn. at 162-63, 444 A.2d at 1384. The Shore court
emphasized that allowing a jury to second-guess an officer's exercise of discre-
tion would result in "no discretion at all." Id. For a discussion of Shore, see supra
notes 26-30 and accompanying text. See also Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at
836 (broadening of police liability must also account for need of police discre-
tion). It is submitted that the concern over limiting police discretion is evi-
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not without merit, it is submitted that a heightened standard of culpabil-
ity could be imposed judicially.
Specifically, it is suggested that a heightened standard of liability
similar to that of the "business judgment rule"160 should be applied in
order to allow jurisdictions, which are fearful of applying traditional
negligence analysis, to abrogate the outdated public duty doctrine. 16'
Under such a standard, liability would not be imposed upon police of-
ficers for simple errors of judgment. 162 Rather, the court would review
the circumstances of the case and the "good faith, independence and
thoroughness" of the officer's decision.' 6 3 It is submitted that such a
standard would represent an appropriate compromise between the pub-
lic duty doctrine and traditional negligence analysis.
16 4
denced by the majority of courts which apply the public duty doctrine. For a
complete listing of these jurisdictions, see supra note 10.
160. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983). Practically,
under the business judgment rule, liability will not be imposed upon corporate
directors merely for the exercise of bad business judgment as to economic con-
ditions, consumer tastes, or production line efficiency. Id.
161. It is submitted that applying either a limited standard of review or a
higher standard of culpability is not a novel approach to cases involving defend-
ants who have greater expertise in an area and who are charged with making
decisions. See, e.g., Berry v. Bean, 796 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1986) (court deferred
to military officer's decision to exclude civilians who had been found in posses-
sion of controlled substances from military base); Currie v. United States, 644 F.
Supp. 1074 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (applying standard analogous to business judg-
ment rule to psychotherapist's decision not to involuntarily commit patient to
mental institution). For a discussion of Currie, see infra note 164.
162. SeeJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1498 (1983). The problem with imposing this standard is that under the
business judgment rule liability is rarely imposed upon a corporate officer or
director merely for exercising poorjudgment. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, it is
submitted that the same effect could result if that standard is applied to the exer-
cise of police discretion. This standard, however, could be justified because, as
in the corporate setting, "after-the-fact-litigation is a most imperfect device to
evaluate" the decisions of policy officers. Cf id. at 886. Moreover, even under
the business judgment rule standard, liability may be found. d. (citations and
examples omitted).
163. Cf. id. 880, 888. It is submitted that such a standard would not unduly
interfere with police discretion forcing police to act in an overly cautious man-
ner. Cf id. at 886 (the business judgment rule will not create incentives for
overly cautious corporate decisions).
164. See Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074 (M.D.N.C. 1986). In
Currie, plaintiff brought an action against the government for the failure of a
psychotherapist at a veterans' hospital to involuntarily commit a mental patient.
Id. at 1077. The court noted that it found the choices of either declining to
impose a duty upon the defendant or imposing a duty based upon traditional
negligence principles unsatisfactory. Id. at 1083. Therefore, the court adopted
a standard analogous to the business judgment rule, characterizing such a stan-
dard as an appropriate compromise. Id. at 1083-85.
35
McMillan: Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION
In the twentieth century, the courts and legislatures of the United
States have expressed and adopted a more humanitarian view of govern-
ment's tort responsibility to the public. 16 5 No longer is government's
liability to be inviolably determined solely upon the public status of the
tortfeasor. Slowly, but inexorably, the courts of this nation are follow-
ing the conclusion of the Adams court that the public duty doctrine is a
relic of a bygone era and has outlived its legitimate usefulness, if indeed
it ever served one.' 66
Therefore, it is submitted that the recent trend toward abrogating
the public duty doctrine enhances justice, equity, and the relationship
between police and public in several ways. The public duty doctrine will
no longer serve as an impenetrable facade automatically barring suits
against the police for negligence, regardless of the egregious nature of
the nonfeasance. It is submitted that by abrogating the public duty doc-
trine a clear message will be sent to law enforcement agencies, that lack-
adaisical responses to pleas for protection will no longer be tolerated.
Agencies suffering large damage judgments must modify their practices
to limit exposure to liability as an ordinary citizen or company would. 167
By modifying their practices where necessary, police will increase public
confidence in law enforcement agencies. It is submitted, in conclusion,
that the efficacy of the public duty doctrine today mirrors that of sover-
eign immunity at the forefront of its fall from grace, and that in the en-
suing years it too will follow into the "dustheap of history."
John Cameron McMillan, Jr.
165. For a discussion of courts' more humanitarian view of government's
tort obligation to the public through the abrogation of sovereign immunity, see
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion ofjurisdictions abrogating the public duty doctrine,
see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Adams
case, see supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
167. See Note, Police Liability, supra note 7, at 835. For a discussion of modi-
fying governmental practices, which will limit exposure to liability, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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